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The Ma’dan (Marsh Arabs) and What Constitutes a Crime
Against Humanity Through Environmental Attacks
I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues
The main issue with regards to the Ma’dan peoples is whether the act of

intentionally draining the marshlands of Iraq constitutes a crime under international law,
and, if so, what elements need to be proven to have a party to those crimes indicted and
convicted. In looking at litigated crimes of the past, there is little direct caselaw on the
issue, therefore, another issue will be whether international law will be convincing in
forming a new area of customary international law to aid in the prosecution of this case.
Finally, there is the issue of attaching the blame for this crime upon specific personages.
Who, for the sake of this case, can and should be charged with these crimes? Is there
evidence to show that a leader at any specific level had real or implied knowledge of the
actions taking place such that they could have intervened prior to the actions or brought
forth punishment to the actors after the offense?
B. Summary of Conclusions
The Crime of Genocide as enunciated in Article 11 of the Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group by performing specific acts. 1 The subsections of this article that are
pertinent to this case are 1. Killing members of the group; 2 2. Causing serious bodily or

1

Coalition Provisional Authority. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Article 11. Reproduced at
Tab #78

2

Coalition Provisional Authority. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Article 11(1). Reproduced at
Tab #78
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mental harm to members of the group; 3 and 3. Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. 4
Under subsection 1, causing the death of or deliberate killing of the members of
the Ma’dan, the proof is in the statistics. The actions of the Iraqi government caused the
people of the Iraqi marshlands to dwindle from 400,000 to merely 40,000. 5 While the
vast majority of those are now refugees, hundreds or even thousands of those were killed
due to infection, disease, and water contaminates. 6
Under subsection 2, there is considerable difficulty in proving and substantiating
claims in this area. It can be assumed, however, that anyone who has such dramatic
circumstances thrust upon them would certainly have psychological, physical and
emotional scars as a result. 7 However, decisions on this subject generally require more
evidence than is present here. Without significant information and evidence to show the
intent to harm in this area, this may be unprovable.
Under subsection 3, the claim is the most significant and proven. When looking
at the damage done to the lifestyles, livelihood, and environment of the Ma’dan, it is
obvious that these conditions were caused with the intent and full knowledge of the
potential effects and repercussions thereof. Additionally, a document seized by Kurdish
3

Coalition Provisional Authority. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Article 11(2). Reproduced at
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rebels during the 1991 uprising shows the specific plans of the Iraqi government. 8 Even
though the Ba’ath party discounts those documents as fabrications, the United Nations
has given them credence and they should be admissible in any hearing in this regard.
When one compares the plans described in this document with the actual events that have
taken place, it appears evident that this blueprint was followed. 9
With statements made by the refugees along with the documentary evidence
present, it appears that the charge of genocide is founded. Though the defense will state
that without the documents obtained during the 1991 uprising there is no case whatsoever
against Hussein himself, the facts in our case are somewhat simpler to prove. 10 It is
evident that Saddam Hussein ordered the canals, dams, and sluices to be built and
intentionally did not have any improvement made that would bring about the use of this
water for improvements to land or person. 11 With this awareness along with the military
actions taking place in the region, it is evident that the actions’ intent is intertwined.
Article 12 of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal describes Crimes against
Humanity as acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with the knowledge of the attack. 12 The pertinent sections are 2.
Extermination, 4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population, 8. Persecution against
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any identifiable group or collectivity, and 10. Other inhumane acts of similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to the body or to the mental or
physical health. 13
Section 2 - Extermination is defined in Subsection 12(b) (2) as including the
intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about destruction of a
segment of population. 14 This definition is almost identical to that espoused in
Subsection 11(a) (3) with regards to the crime of genocide. 15 The evidence provided to
show the good cause of action under that crime will prove this allegation as well.
Section 4 has significant proof that the Ma’dan people were, in fact, forced to
move to different areas without their willing consent. The important portion of any claim
in this area will be to prove that the actions were to attack a protected class of people and
that they were widespread and systematic. 16 It seems evident that these elements are
proven here. The Ma’dan are the primary inhabitants of the marshlands of Iraq and
during the course of twelve years, the government actively worked to deprive one group
of people their livelihood, environment and lives. 17
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Section 8 will be proven with the acceptable evidence shown for Section 4. The
Ma’dan is a specific, unique, and identifiable group that was targeted through systematic
planning and implementation of a plan. 18
Section 10 is an all encompassing provision intended to ensure that even with the
proper defenses implemented, an egregious actor will be brought to justice. In this case,
it will be once against affirmed the extent to which the marsh people were harmed.
II.

Factual Background:
For more than 5,000 years there has been civilization at the confluence of the

Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in what is now Southeastern Iraq. 19 These people have
subsisted in an isolated state, untouched by the destruction, advancement, and power
struggles of the outside world. 20 The Ma’dan peoples lived in tribes throughout what was
one of the most expansive marshlands in the world. 21 They became known for their
harmonious relationship to the nature around them. The Iraqi Marshes, which at one
point covered more than 20,000 kilometers of area, 22 were home to numerous life forms
including hundreds of species of migratory birds, fish, and rare species of animals that
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could not be found anywhere else in the world. 23 The Ma’dan people’s actions were
special, in that they lived along side of these animals on manmade reed and mud islands,
subsisting on the products of the area, using the natural filtration qualities of the marshes
to improve their lives, aid in the growing of crops and the raising of water buffalo. 24
These peaceful, Shiite Muslims were largely content with their lifestyles, and this
civilization likely would have continued in generally the same fashion had they remained
as they were.
During the 1980’s, this isolation and peace was interrupted by acts of aggression
between the countries of Iraq and Iran. 25 During the Iran-Iraq War, numerous Marsh
Iraqis joined the Iraqi military and were praised for their efforts. 26 However, this praise
soon turned to scorn as an increasing number of dissidents, political enemies, and Iranian
agents were known to have hidden in the remote expanses of the marshes. 27 Merely
eleven years later, in 1991, many of these Ma’dan Arabs or Marsh Iraqis found
themselves thrust into an unfamiliar world. Forced to leave behind the livelihood that
they knew, only to flee from destruction, death and hardship delivered by their very own
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government. 28
A.

The Gulf War and the 1991 Uprising

Since the time of the Shiite revolution in Iran, the leadership of Iraqi government
had been worried about any significant buildup of Shia peoples or dissident forces within
the country of Iraq. 29 Since the Iran-Iraq War, the Baathist leadership had made it clear
that they were displeased with the fact that political enemies, army deserters and Shia
leaders were taking asylum in the marshlands rather than face the repercussion from their
government. 30 As the Gulf War drew to an end, there was a clear message from the
allied forces. This message was that the country of Iraq was weak and that those who
would wish to overthrow the current government should move quickly. 31 Unfortunately,
many of the rebellious forces also took this to mean that they would receive military aid
from the allies, but they were mistaken. 32
On February 28, 1991, A Shiite commander of an Iraqi Tank Battalion set off a
full revolt in the Southern city of Basra. 33 During the course of the next several weeks,
hundreds of Baathist Officials, police personnel, and elected leaders were killed in the
28
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30
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revolt. 34 Also, numerous offices were raided and documents seized. 35 At almost the
same time, the Kurds in the North of Iraq began a revolt as well. 36 During the next few
weeks, the warring parties of the South, aided by the Badr Battalion that crossed the
marshes from Iran, took control of large areas of Iraq including many of the large
southern cities. 37 By and large, the Marsh Arabs had little involvement in the uprising,
though a small segment, mostly religious leaders, were heavily involved in the planning
and implementation of the infida. 38 In March, the Iraqi central government finally began
retaking control of the land and putting down the revolts. 39
The methods used in the reclamation of the peace in Iraq were astonishing. There
are reports of helicopter gunships firing indiscriminately into crowds of civilians, 40 the
use of napalms and other chemical agents 41 and the mass capture, murder and forced
relocation of tens of thousands of people. 42 Children and women were often used as

34
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human shields to protect the military equipment from attack. 43 The military continued to
advance, destroying entire cities and villages, capturing all that may remotely have been
involved in the uprising, burning crops and homes, and attacking Shia Shrines. 44
Estimations of more than one hundred thousand casualties in the south alone are
prominent. 45 More than one hundred Shiite clerics were arrested and disappeared while
in Iraqi custody. 46 When the revolt was put down, as many as ten thousand people
escaped to the marshes hoping that they would protect them from the wrath of Saddam
Hussein. 47
Once the tensions subsided and the Iraqi military was once again clearly in
command, the attacks on the southern Shia population failed to stop.48 From 1991 until
the United States invaded in 2003, there continued to be a multi-pronged plan to not only
prevent another overthrow attempt, but to systematically eliminate everything that the
Marsh Arabs held dear. 49 This plan attacked their faith, their livelihoods, their homes,
their land, their freedom, and their lives. 50 The military justification for these actions

43
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were to bring the people to justice that had killed government officials during the
revolt, 51 but the indiscriminate and violent means used to accomplish that goal makes it
clear that the ultimate goal was much more severe.
B.

The Military Operations

While the actions of the Iraqi government in putting down the revolt attempt were
egregious, the fact that they continued military operations is telling with regards to their
true intentions vis-à-vis the Marsh Arabs. The fact that the marshlands were drained,
along with the fact that the military continued operations involving the violent
apprehension and murder of Marsh Arabs may have a number of reasons; however, the
most plausible one is merely that there was a direct intent to continue the attacks and
destruction of the Ma’dan people. 52
Despite the fact that the Iraqi infida had long since ended and the people involved
had retreated to the marsh areas for safety, the Iraqi government failed to end their
actions in the region. 53 In fact, up until the United States’ invasion of the country of Iraq
in 2003, there are reports of continued military action in the marshes. 54 Reports from
Marsh Arab refugees along with pictures and imagery from the area seem to show a
pattern of behavior in the region. The military would systematically shell each village
and then use tanks, bulldozers and infantry personnel to go into the village. 55 All those
that could have potentially been involved in any sort of plot against the government in the
51

Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker. Reproduced at Tab #4

52
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present or past would either be arrested or sentenced to death on the spot, and the entire
village would be burned and/or razed. 56 There are also reports from thousands of people
that were forcibly relocated to the northern expanses of Iraq. 57 The extent of the
destruction brought forth by these military operations was indicative of a scorched Earth
philosophy. 58 The houses would be razed, the crops burned, the date palm trees would be
decapitated to eliminate their production, food stuffs would be seized, and land taken for
future military outposts. 59 Additionally, there are numerous reports of the use of poisons
in the water system to destroy the fishing production, burning of the reed beds to destroy
their main craft based monetary source, as well as the use of chemical weapons in the
invasions. 60 The loss of the water system caused the transportation of goods that they
could continue making nearly impossible, and impeded the escape from the hostile
governmental forces. 61
C.

The Drainage Project-A Historical Prospective

From the very dawn of man, the people of Iraq have strived to control the waters
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for agricultural purposes. In the early 1950’s, the
country, then under English control, contracted for the production of the Haigh Report
which detailed a system of dams, canals, locks and sluices that would enable the country
56
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of Iraq to divert water from the two mighty rivers and produce thousands of hectares of
farmland while desalinating the area. 62 Some minor work began in 1953 on the project
but its great expense caused Iraq to abandon the project. 63 However, those plans were
put fully into practice in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. 64 During that time, the
marshes of ancient Mesopotamia began to shrink. However, with the onset of the war
with Iran, actions were halted. 65 The majority of the work performed on the intricate
plan was done from 1991-1994. 66 Even in the 1990’s, the intent of the plan, officially,
was to regain marshland for crop production, irrigate other crop locations, and improve
sanitation in the area. 67 The effect of the plan was that nearly all of the water that fed the
three marshland areas of Iraq was held back or diverted away from the marshland area. 68
As a result of the implementation of this plan, at least ninety percent of the marshes were
destroyed by 2003. 69
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In addition to military attacks in the area that killed thousands of civilians, the
draining of the marshlands itself caused massive damage. 70 Reports have surfaced that
perhaps thousands of people had died or become severely ill from water contamination
and disease. 71 These issues were not as present prior to the drainage because the water
movement through the marsh areas prevented much of the contaminants from settling and
diseases from forming. 72 Also, with the elimination of the marsh environment, the crops,
livestock, and reeds that were so vital to the livelihood of the Ma’dan were decimated.
The people were forced to decide whether to stay and die from disease and warfare, or
become refugee in other countries or in their own. 73
While the official reason for the drainage program was to enhance productivity
for the country, to date, these improvements have yet to be used for any such purpose.74
Additionally, the military actions in this region, directed toward the Ma’dan people and
other marsh dwellers from 1991-2003 provide more than adequate reason to believe that
the actual intent for drainage of the marsh areas was for the destruction of the marsh
Arabs, their livelihood and their culture, the repression of the Ma’dan as Shia Muslims,
and the forced displacement of these peoples from their rightful homeland. 75
D.

The Drainage Project-The Plan’s Details

70
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It is important to note the priority given to this project by the Iraqi government.
This project cost more money than nearly all other single items in the Iraqi budget for the
years of 1991-1994 when the bulk of the building took place. 76 However, with the
importance given to a project purported to be the improvement of the economy and crop
production of the country, there was never any significant money put into using the
newly acquired water to produce viable crop producing areas. 77 Instead, the bulk of the
water diverted from the marshes was put into canals that led directly into the Persian
Gulf. 78 This by itself has significant evidentiary value in that it tends to negate
arguments that the true intent of the actions were for the country’s ultimate gain rather
than to eliminate a people and their habitat.
This plan, which led to what the United Nations deemed to be, “One of the
Earth’s major and most thoughtless environmental disasters” 79 , was begun in earnest in
1991 and largely resembled the plan put forth in the 1950’s with certain undeniable
exceptions. 80
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The prize part of this plan was the massive Third River. 81 This canal was
intended to clean more than 1.5 million hectares of farmland. 82 This two kilometer
wide, 83 560 kilometer long marvel runs south from Al Mahmudiya, near Baghad, and
eventually joins with the Shatt al Basrah and goes into the Persian Gulf. 84 This project is
largely the same as envisioned in the Haigh Report. This is one defense used to justify
the actions of the government, however, the original plan made sure that the water
leading to the canal was not so diverted as to prevent water from entering into the
marshes. 85 That is not what the government of Iraq implemented however. Instead, a
massive earth dam was placed some ten kilometers southeast of An Nasiriyah which
diverts nearly all of the flow of the Euphrates into the canal and past the marshlands. 86
This addition, along with other changes to the plan, effectively diverts large segments of
the river’s water prior to entering the majority of the marshlands. 87
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What the third river fails to divert, the Fourth River, or “Mother of all Battles”
River does. 88 This canal takes river water from north of An Nasiriyah and diverts
massive portions of the Euphrates into the Khawr az Zubayr and then into the Persian
Gulf. 89
The next phase of the plan is a massive double levee which runs from the Al
Jandallah in Misan, thirty-five kilometers southeast to Abu Ajil where it joins up with the
Al Amarah canal. 90 This levee effectively cuts off and diverts the water from more than
forty rivers and streams which once fed the marshes. 91 In addition to these actions, more
than thirty dykes were placed in the marshes to prevent the inflow of water. 92
Finally, locks and sluices placed at the head of the Tigris distributaries in the Al
Amarah area regulate and eliminate flow to the marshes. The effect is to reroute the
majority of the water to massive depressions or ponds to evaporate. 93
E.

The Drainage Project-Religious Attacks

The final prong of this plan was the outright elimination of the leaders of the Shia
faith in the marsh area. As stated before, more than one hundred clerics and religious
scholars within the Shia faith were taken into custody during the times of the uprising in
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1991. 94 In addition to this, from 1991-2003, numerous repressive actions were done
against the members of the Shia faith. 95 These actions included attacks on the offices of
prominent Shia leaders, restriction on the rights of Shia followers to pray or attend
ceremonies required under their faith, and the capture and murder of Shia Leaders.96 The
two leaders whose murders brought the most interest from the outside world were those
of Grand Ayattolah Shaykh Mirza Al-Gharawi and Ayattolah Shaykh Murtada AlBurujerdi. 97 These two were murdered because they performed services and rituals
required under their religion, but banned by the Iraqi government. Many of their
followers went to the streets to protest their capture and eventual murder, and were
themselves the victims of gunfire. 98 This systematic attack on the Shiite faith and the
marsh Arabs did not stop at mere actions by the government themselves. The
government is reported to have used its propaganda machine to call for the destruction of
the Ma’dan people whom they referred to as “subhuman”, “monkey-faced”, and “unIraqi”. 99 These actions also bring to light the motives of the Iraqi government, making it
clear that their distain for the people of the marshes was never hidden and quite clear in
their words and actions.
F.

After Effects on Nature of the Plan’s Implementation
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The environmental effects of these actions are considered, even today, to be
largely irreversible. 100 Entire habitats were destroyed, water quality was decimated, and
the local climate has been horribly affected. 101 It is believed that many species endemic
to the area are now extinct as a result of the marshlands drainage as well as the
destruction of grounds that were typically used by migratory birds and spawning areas
used by fish and other wildlife. 102 The lack of water runoff from the marshes has allowed
salt water into fisheries in the south destroying almost the entire industry. 103 Poisons and
other contaminants in the water have destroyed much of the fish in the marshes
themselves, causing a complete loss in the fishing industry that once produced sixty
percent of the fish consumed by the country. 104 Additionally, because these fish fed on
the larvae of mosquitoes that were in the marshland area, the population of mosquitoes
has skyrocketed causing increases in diseases carried by the insect. 105 The date palm
industry, that once was the world’s largest exporter, was decimated mostly by conscious
military action. 106 Because of the living conditions, lack of food and outright removal by
the military, much of the livestock, eggs, crops and fish are no longer available in the
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marshlands. 107 When the military moved through an area, they typically destroyed the
reed beds leading to a decrease in local reed production by nearly eighty percent. 108
Finally, the reduction of the water in the marshland area has caused a massive increase in
the temperatures in the region, increased water evaporation and decreased precipitation in
the region. 109 These phenomena are expected to only continue to worsen until the water
levels are significantly increased. 110 Scientists have noted that had this water been used
as it was intended, to irrigate other areas, some of the damage done would not have been
as extensive, 111 but, as Max Van Der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq stated, there is extremely little
evidence of successful land reclamation and indisputable evidence of widespread
destruction and human suffering. 112
G.

After Effects on the Ma’dan People of the Plan’s Implementation

The effect on the habitat was such that it is believed that as many as tens of
thousands of Ma’dan people died from the conditions that they were forced to endure. 113
In a statement by the United Nations General Assembly, “the sinking water level makes
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survival in the marshlands….almost impossible…” 114 It is also believed that in order to
escape the living conditions, more than 200,000 Marsh Arabs voluntarily became
refugees within their own country or abroad, 115 and that tens of thousands more were
forced against their will into rearabization projects or other forced resettlement
programs. 116 In addition to the violent treatment at the hands of the military, the Ma’dan
were forced to live with an enforced economic blockade to the area as well as an enforced
ban on medical treatment of the wounded marsh dwellers.117 Absent proper medical care,
the people that chose to stay were forced to endure malnutrition, schistosomiasis, worms,
cholera, bilharzias, dysentery, other water borne infections and diseases. 118 With the
devastated economy in the region, those that were able to find someone to buy their
goods were forced to trek through waist high mud to transport products. 119 This
effectively eliminated any chance of commerce for the Ma’dan people.
In interviews with Ma’dan refugees in the country of Iran, Baroness Emma
Nicholson noted that the psychological impact that this torment has had on the refugees
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was “total and devastating.” 120 She stated that many were in a state of desolation and
utter hopelessness and held out little if any hope that they would ever be able to return to
the sort of life that they had lived prior to 1991. 121 She stated that they often felt that
their plight was unimportant to the outside world and that no change would ever occur in
the Government of Iraq. 122
III.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS/CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The country of Iraq was subject to a number of treaties and conventions that they had
either voluntarily become part of or had otherwise become customary international laws.
The Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention incorporated customary international
law when it stated, “the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and rule
of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the law of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” 123
This allows for the use of customary international law in the absence of a specific rule
affecting the area of law. Article 38(1) of the Statute for the International Court of
Justice gives some insight as to what should be considered to be customary international
law stating, “International Conventions…International Custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted a law,… the general principle of law recognized by civilized
nations,…judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
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the various nations.” 124 There are numerous conventions and rulings that can bring
insight as to whether these actions constitute a crime under international law.
A. Conventions That Iraq is a Signatory of
1. 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide
This convention was convened in part due to the actions in the holocaust as well
as some of the atrocities that took place on the eastern front of the Second World War. 125
As Iraq is a signatory of this convention, they are bound to the articles of it. Article 1
clearly states that genocide need not be in a time of war for it to be a crime. 126 The
pertinent parts of the definition of the crime of genocide are found in Article 2 when it
states that genocide is an act of killing a member of a group, causing serious bodily injury
or mental harm to a member of a group, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life on a
group that are calculated to bring about their demise in whole or in part, when the acts are
intended to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 127
This convention allows for the punishment of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and
complicity to commit genocide. 128 As a signatory of this convention, if there is sufficient
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evidence to suggest that the leadership of Iraq acted with the intent to destroy the Ma’dan
people, they would clearly be in violation of this convention.
Intent remains one of the most difficult hurdles to any criminal case. With the
facts present in this case, it is important to note the extensively long timeframe of the
criminal activity, which would allow for the correction of criminal action and the
recuperation of the marshlands had the leadership desired to do so. In order to show that
the specific intent was the murder or destruction of the Ma’dan, rather than merely their
forcible removal from the area, one should only have to look towards the means used.
Had the intent to be the moving of the people, the substantiated claims regarding mass
murder of civilians would not have been necessary. Additionally, the blockade which
prevented the Marsh Arabs from attaining medical care in their own country was wholly
unnecessary if actions other than the destruction of the people were the true intent.
2. Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War
This convention was signed by the country of Iraq and is therefore binding on
them as international law. 129 Under the common Article 3 of this convention, the parties
to this convention, in the case of a non-international armed conflict must treat persons
who are not party to the conflict, even if they are not a party due to illness or injury, with
humanity. 130 Additionally, treatment, whether it is ill or well, shall not be contingent on
the race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria of the
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person or group. 131 Additionally, Article 147 states that it will be considered a grave
breach of the convention if any of the following actions take place: “wilful killing, torture
or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of
a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular
trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction
and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.” 132 If there is evidence that non-parties to the armed conflict
were treated in an inhumane manner or any of the breaches spoken of in Article 147 have
been committed, then Iraq is in breach of this convention.
Even if the intent was not solely to cause the death of the Ma’dan peoples, this
convention shall grant them relief. As they were not a party to any armed conflict after
the time of 1991, they would surely be covered by the protections of this convention.
There seems to be substantial evidence to suggest that the Ma’dan people were treated
inhumanely and that they were subject to willful killing, injury to body and mind, and
destruction and appropriation of property. The government of Iraq does not dispute that
they forcibly took land from the Ma’dan people by way of draining the marshlands and
appropriating certain tracts of land for military outposts. This being the case, they
knowingly committed a grave breach of Article 147. Additionally, evidence can be
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brought to bear to prove the existence of murderous intent with the destruction of the
marshlands.
3. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
The ENMOD Convention is both signed by the country of Iraq and considered to
be customary international law; therefore, Iraq is subject to its articles. 133 Article I states
that each party will undertake to not use environmental manipulation or modification
techniques to cause widespread, long-lasting, or severe harm to another state party. 134
The terms widespread, long-lasting and severe are intended, under this convention, to
mean several hundred kilometers, a period of months, and involving serious or significant
disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources and other assets
respectively. 135 Environmental manipulation has two main categories.136 First, those
acts which involve massive and extended applications of disruptive techniques. Second,
those acts which involve small disruptive actions but release massive amounts of
destructive energy. 137 In the present case, the first type of category is present. The
second category is most easily described as when a dam is destroyed. The energy
necessary to cause the harm is short term and relatively small in size, but the destructive
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nature of the result is massive. 138 Article IV encourages countries who are a party to the
convention to take measures that are appropriate to prevent environmental damage within
their own jurisdiction. 139 Under the auspices of this convention, the state of Iraq will be
liable for a breach of this convention if it can be effectively proven that the Ma’dan
peoples are a state party under the convention.
While this convention is generally viewed to protect actions against foreign states,
it may be important in the formation of an argument that such protections should be
extended within their own boundaries.
4. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
This convention was signed by the country of Iraq and is therefore binding upon
the country as a voluntary signatory. 140 Subsection (2) of Article 1 States that all peoples
may freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice, but that in no
case may a people be deprived of their means of subsistence.141 As a signatory of this
convention Iraq seems to be in breech if it can be proven that the Ma’dan people had their
means of subsistence taken from them.
The question with regard to this convention is what particularly constitutes a
people. Largely, international judiciaries have held that in this type of context, they mean
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a country or other large segment of society. It is unclear at this time whether an argument
can be made that the Ma’dan people constitute a people under the auspices of this
definition.
B. Customary International Law
1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions is widely accepted as being customary
international law and is therefore binding on all countries that have failed to blatantly
refuse to accept the auspices of the law. 142 Since Iraq has failed in their obligations
regarding refusal to accept, they are therefore bound under the auspices of this
convention. While this convention is largely to protect the combatants in international
conflict, Subsection (4) of Article One states that this protocol also affects, “armed
conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.” 143 In defining
what would constitute a racist regime, the Commentary to Article one states that there
should be at least a rift within a people which ensures hegemony of one section in
accordance with racist ideas. 144 Article 35, Subsection (3) states that it is prohibited to
employ methods or means of warfare intended or expected to cause widespread, long-
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term, and severe damage to the natural environment. 145 The definitions of widespread,
long-term, and severe are not present in the commentary. 146 Article 54 prohibits the
attacking, destroying, or rendering useless objects that are indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population. These items are noted as including drinking water supplies and
installations, food stuffs, and agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs. 147
Article 55 states that due care should be taken to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term, and severe damage which will prejudice the health and survival of
the population. 148
It seems evident from the propaganda put forth by the Iraqi government that there
would certainly be a rift present that would satisfy the racist regime requirement.
Additionally, while it is uncertainly what the convention means by the terms widespread,
long-term, and severe, it can be inferred that the circumstances in this case would
certainly qualify as this constitutes the destruction of more than 18,000 kilometers of
marshlands over the course of twelve years, involving harm to hundreds of thousands of
people. Additionally, the destruction of the Ma’dan people’s ability to attain sustenance
through the destruction of the marshes would constitute a breach of Article 54.
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2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
This convention has been widely accepted as customary international law, and, as
such is binding upon the country of Iraq. 149 Article one states that this convention is
intended to be for the protection of internal armed conflicts in which the dissidents or
other armed groups are under reasonable command and exercise enough control over part
of the territory as to enable the carrying out of military operations. 150 These conditions
are important in that they delineate these instances from those in which there is a mere
internal disturbance, riot, or other isolated or sporadic act of violence. 151 Article 2 states
that those who have been deprived of liberty during or after the conflict will have the
protections of Articles 5 and 6 until such time as their liberty is restored. 152 Article 3
says that the provisions of this convention do not limit the ways in which a sovereign
power may legally reestablish law and order within their boundaries. 153 Article 4 states
that those who are not a part of the hostilities or who have ceased to be a part of the
hostilities are to be granted respect for their person, honor, convictions and religious
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practices, and shall be treated humanely without adverse distinction. 154 Article 4
Subsection (2) states that collective punishments and acts of terrorism shall be
prohibited. 155 Article 5 Subsection (3) states that if a party has their liberty restricted in
any way, the party restricting said liberty must comply with the rules set forth in Article 4
and Article 5 Sub Subsections (1)(a,c,d) and (2)(b). 156 Sub Subsection 5 (1) (a) states
that the wounded shall be given medical treatment. 157 Sub subsection 5 (1) (c) states that
the group will be afforded collective relief. 158 Sub subsection 5 (1) (d) says that the
restricted party will be allowed to fully practice their religion if possible. 159 Sub
Subsection 5 (2) (b) allows for the restricted party to send and receive correspondence. 160
Article 6 Subsection (5) notes that at the end of the hostilities, the governing party will
endeavor to grant broad amnesty to those who participated in the uprising and those
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whom had their freedoms and liberty restricted or deprived. 161 Article 13 grants the
greatest protection available to civilians from military operations. 162 Subsection 13 (2)
states that the civilian population shall not be the target of military attack and that acts or
threats of violence for the purpose of spreading fear amongst the people shall not be
permitted in any way. 163 Article 14 notes that starvation is prohibited as well as any
attempt to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects which are indispensable for
the survival of the civilian populations. 164 Such items are generally believed to be
foodstuffs, agricultural areas, crops, livestock, and drinking water. Article 17 Subsection
(1) states that there must be imperative military reasons for the displacement of a civilian
population to be ordered. 165 Article 17 Subsection (2) states that civilians shall not be
compelled to leave their own territory. 166
The most important hurdle in this statute is to prove that the level of control that
the rebelling parties had was sufficient to justify protection under this convention. There
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is reason to believe that the rebels held numerous cities in the south for no less than two
full weeks. Therefore, it seems apparent that they would satisfy this prong of the test,
thereby substantiating the bringing of charges for breaches of all of the above mentioned
articles.
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
While Iraq is not a party to this court, this statute has attained the level of
customary international law, and is therefore enforceable upon the government of the
country of Iraq. 167 The definition of the crime of Genocide noted in this statute is
identical to those of the 1948 Genocide Convention; therefore, it need not be further
discussed. 168 It is important to note Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity. According to
this code, it constitutes a crime against humanity when an act is performed in
coordination with a systematic and widespread attack on a civilian population and when
the perpetrator has knowledge of the attack. 169 These acts are murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation or other forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, persecution
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred
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to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, enforced
disappearance of persons, the crime of apartheid, and other inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health. 170
By the International Criminal Court’s Statute being a customary international law,
its definitions, which are largely the same as in the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
bring increased credence of the requirements under the IST. It is important to note that
an attack against a civilian population requires that the attack be within a course of
conduct and that the action be in furtherance of governmental policy. 171 The term
extermination includes the use of conditions of life to bring about the demise of part of
the population. These conditions include the deprivation of access to food or medical
care. 172 Forced transfer of population means the use of force or other coercive mean to
displace a population from a location which they lawfully abide in. 173 Persecution means
the intentional, severe, and unlawful deprivation of fundamental rights tied to identity
within a group or collectivity. 174

C. Potentially Customary International Law
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1. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage
While this convention is not signed by the Country of Iraq, it could be deemed to
customary international law and therefore would be enforceable if such a determination is
made. 175 Additionally, at this juncture, the Iraqi marshlands have not been designated as
a World Heritage Site because the country of Iraq failed to request that such an action
take place. If the court finds that this law is applicable to the situation at bar, then the
country would be bound by the Article which states that they are to ensure the
identification, protection, conservation, presentation, and transmission to future
generations of the cultural and natural heritage…situated on its territory. 176

2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
This is another convention that may or may not be deemed to have reached the
status of customary international law. If it has, then the country of Iraq would be bound
by its articles. Article 3 states that all people have a right to life, liberty and security of
their person. Article 5 decrees that no one should be subject to cruel or inhumane
treatment. Article 9 says that no one should be forced into exile. Article 13 states that all
persons should have the right to freedom of movement and residence. Article 17 says
that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of their property. 177

IV.

THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the international community
declared that those within the governing body of Iraq, who had committed crimes under
international law, should stand before a tribunal and be forced to defend their actions. In
accordance with that declaration, the rules of law, under which these persons will be
charged, have been set forth. 178 Many of the rules of law are identical to other criminal
provisions discussed above. When reviewing the IST’s Statute, we should evaluate the
crimes and potential defenses that are prevalent among cases from the tribunals in the
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.

A. Criminal Responsibility, Criminal Participation, and Command
Responsibility
In order for a person to be held liable for any crime under international law, they
must be first found to have knowingly been involved in the commission of the crime. 179
First of all, there is the concept of individual criminal responsibility. This responsibility
extends as high as any officer within the chain of command who knew of the acts taking
place. 180 In order to prove that the party should be held to have criminal responsibility, it
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must be shown that they participated in the planning or implementation of the plan with
some knowledge of the plan’s intent. 181
Participation has been broken down into five elements; planning, incitement,
ordering, commission, and aiding and abetting. 182 In order to be found liable for
planning the criminal act, one or more parties must have contemplated the preparation
and implementation phases of the plan. 183 For a finding of incitement participation, one
must have investigated another, directly and publicly with the intent that they commit the
offense. 184 Except for the case of genocide, this only constitutes a crime if the actual
offense is committed. 185 Ordering participation requires a superior agent to demand the
commission of the crime from a subordinate party. The Yugoslavian Tribunal held in
Blaskić that a party who orders an act or omission must be aware of the substantial
likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the order in order to show
the required mens rea to be deemed culpable. 186 Commission participation may take
place through a direct inflicting of harm or through the intended omission of an act that is
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required to prevent an offense from taking place. 187 Aiding and Abetting the commission
of an act is a multifaceted act that takes place during the planning phase of the crime. 188
The party need not be present at the commission of the crime to be held liable. In fact,
the assistance need not even be geographically or temporarily tied to that of the crime’s
commission. 189 The act must contribute substantially to the commission of the crime and
may be in the form of physical assistance or moral support. The party must also
demonstrate knowledge of the crime’s broader intent. 190
Command Responsibility is a very powerful concept that must be shown in order
to convict leaders for acts tied to criminal activity. In order to show that the party held
command responsibility, there must first be a showing that they held effective command
and control over the parties that committed the act. 191 If they cannot be shown to hold
said power, then they may not be held liable. Also, they must be shown to have had or
should have had knowledge of the commission of the criminal act by their subordinates
and failed to take action to prevent or mitigate the harm caused. 192 If the party was
unable to halt or mitigate the commission of the acts, they must actively show that they
187
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reported the crimes to the proper authorities and ensured that the parties that took part in
the crimes were prosecuted for their actions. 193

B. Evaluation of Elements of Crimes
1. Genocide
a. General Standards
Article 11 of the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal delineates the requirements
for the Crime of Genocide. Genocide is defined as the commission of one or more of a
group of acts with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group. 194 Since this crime can be prosecuted against those who directly
committed the acts as well as those who planned and ordered the actions, the
international courts have held prosecutors to a very high standard to prove the “crime of
crimes.” 195
Other than the specific crimes involved, the tribunals in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia have noted the importance of the concepts of “in part”, “intent”, and “group”.
They have defined and solidified the meanings of these portions and have shown the
requirements burdening the prosecution under these rules.
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First of all, “in part” has been determined to require being a substantial portion of
the group. 196 In order to be determined to be a substantial portion, the courts have
reviewed the targeted group’s numeric size, their prominence within the whole of the
group, and the area of the perpetrator’s activity and control in committing the crimes. 197
The “intent” element of the crime of Genocide has been shown to be very
important and illusory. International courts have grappled with the concept of dolus
specialis, or special intent, which means that in order to be convicted of the crime of
genocide one must show that they intended the specific crime to occur against a party
because of the victim’s group affiliation. 198 The Akayesu court held that the victim must
be chosen because of their membership in the protected group, therefore the victim can
actually be said to have been the group, rather than the individual themselves. 199 The
courts have notes that the intent is a mental aspect that cannot readily be proven without a
confession, therefore they have allowed for circumstantial evidence to prove the specific
intent. 200 The International Criminal Court has allowed for the evaluation of the nature
of the orders given that led to the act in determining whether special intent was
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present. 201 The Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals have allowed for a number of factors
to be reviewed such as presumptions of fact, the general context of other culpable acts,
the scale of the atrocities, the deliberate and systematic nature of the acts, specific words
or deeds used, and the direct targeting of a specific group while excluding other
groups. 202
The idea of a protected group is one that permeates the entirety of international
law. In this case, the Rwanda tribunal has chosen to define each of the protected groups
as well as expand on the notion of a protected group. First, they find a “national” group
to be a collectivity of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on
citizenship, coupled with the interplay of rights and duties. 203 Next, they find an “ethnic”
group to be one in which its members share a common language or culture. 204 A “racial”
group is identified based on hereditary traits which are often specific to a geographical
region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national, or religious factors. 205 Finally, a
“religious” group is deemed to share the same religion, denomination or mode of
worship. 206 Whether a particular group should be deemed to be within a protected class
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has generally been reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but may also include any stable and
identifiable group. 207
b. Killing
While the definitions of killing differs from country to country, the international
courts have deemed that it is important for to onus be on the prosecution in any case and
that all protections should be afforded the accused in international cases. In that regard,
they have held that the more stringent standard of killing with the specific intent to cause
death should be proven in such cases. 208
c. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm
The court in Rwanda has held that this crime shall include, but not be limited to
bodily and mental torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence, and
persecution. 209 The court notes that the harm caused need not be permanent for this to
constitute a crime. 210 The crime of persecution also falls under the auspices of crimes
against humanity.
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d. Inflicting Conditions of Life Calculated to Bring About a
Group’s Destruction
The Rutaganda court held that this crime includes all methods of destruction by
which the perpetrator does not necessarily intend to immediately kill the members of the
group, but which are ultimately aimed at the group’s physical destruction. 211 These
methods include subjecting the people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion of
people from their homes, and deprivation of essential medical supplies. 212 This act does
not require that the group actually be destroyed, but rather that an attempt be made
through the implementation of these means. 213

2. Crimes Against Humanity
a. General Standards
Crimes against humanity require four major elements be present to constitute a
crime. In addition to these elements, the courts have held that the attack must be directed
against the target population and that the perpetrator must know that his actions are in
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furtherance of this attack. 214 The targeted group includes not only the base group, but
also those who are deemed by the perpetrator to be sympathetic to the target group.
The first element is that the action must be inhumane in nature and character,
thereby causing great suffering to body or mind. 215
Next, the act must be part of a widespread or systematic attack. The Rutoganda
court held that “widespread” should be deemed to mean a massive, frequent, large scale
action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims. 216 That same court held “systematic” to mean a thoroughly
organized action following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy and
involving substantial public or private resources. 217 The Simic court held that a tribunal
may review factors such as the consequences on the targeted population, the number of
victims, the nature of the attack, the participation of officials and authorities, or patterns
of the crime when determining whether an act is widespread or systematic. 218
Next, the act must be committed against a civilian population. A “civilian
population” is broadly interpreted to include not only persons who are not directly party
214
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to hostilities, but also to those who have been placed hors de combat due to illness,
injury, detention, or other such reasons. 219 To take direct part in hostilities is defined as
taking part in acts of war by which their nature or purpose is to cause actual harm to the
personnel and equipment of the enemy forces. 220
Finally, the actions must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds.
This element has been the brunt of numerous cases and has been found to vary from
tribunal to tribunal. The Rwanda tribunal is similar to that of the IST in that it only
specifically denotes discriminatory purpose for the crime of persecution, therefore, it can
be inferred that this tribunal will only require it for this specific act.
b. Murder
Murder, as described for the “killing” act under the Genocide article, requires that
the party commit or order an unlawful act or omission leading to the death of the victim,
when, at the time of the crime, the perpetrator had the intent to cause grievous bodily
harm. 221 Since the IST Statute does not speak to the requirement of discriminatory intent
in the commission of this crime, it is uncertain whether it will be required.
c. Extermination
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Extermination requires elements of mass destruction and by its nature seems to
require an element of discriminatory purpose. 222 The essential elements are that the
accused or an ordered subordinate were involved in the killing of a group of described
people, that the act or omission was unlawful and intentional, part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population, and the victims qualify as a protected
group. 223 This crime does not require the direct act of killing, but may also include a
group of underlying acts which lead to the death of the targeted group. 224
d. Deportation
The IST Statute defines this as the forcible displacement of persons, who lawfully
reside in an area, through direct expulsion or other coercive acts. 225 This displacement
must not be justified under other international law. The displacement may take place
within the country’s borders or may extend to another country and must involve the intent
of the perpetrator to force such a move and that displacement be permanent. 226 If there is
a question as to the intention of the victim to move, the international courts have pushed
for a full evaluation of the victim’s circumstances at the time of the move to ensure that
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they were not subject to an inherently coercive environment when they chose to leave. A
lack of true free will may be inferred from acts such as shelling of civilian locations,
burning of civilian property, threats or acts of force, or other crimes intended to terrify
the population. 227
e. Persecution of a Group or Collectivity
The court has held that the crime of persecution requires a finding that the
accused committed acts or omissions against a victim or victim population, violating their
basic or fundamental rights, that the accused intended to commit the violation, that there
was a discriminatory purpose, and that the acts were committed on political, racial, or
religious grounds. 228 When determining cases of persecution where the elements are not
spelled out in the statute, the courts must view the action in its context and its cumulative
effect to see if it has the effect of persecuting the targeted victim population. 229

V.

EVIDENCE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO THE PROSECUTION
A. Seized Documents
The primary defense used by any accused party in an international case is merely

that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the offense. While a confession is the
easiest form of evidence, it is also the least prevalent and brings with it a shadow of
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cynicism because it is usually tied to a plea agreement. In the current instance, there are
two physical pieces of evidence that have been seized which demonstrate that the actions
extend beyond politically acceptable purposes. The former is a document that was seized
from a water engineer in the marsh area in 1991 and the latter is a document sent from the
Director of Security for the Governate of Arbil to the Shaqlawa Security Director in
1989. 230 The second letter describes in detail a plan of actions which it states was
adopted and approved by the “president and commander-in-chief”. 231 This plan
describes a number of objectives to disrupt the “subversive activity” in the marshes. 232
The plan allows for the directed ordering of poisonings, explosions, and house burning of
suspected subversives, paid assassins, and controlled vehicle travel to the marshlands
area. 233 The most severe steps are the call for the burning and destruction of homes if a
marsh civilian is suspected of collaborating with the subversives, and the call for a full
blockade against any village which harbors, knowingly or not, a subversive. 234 This
blockade entails the withdrawal of all food supply agencies, a full ban on the sale of fish
from the area, the “severest measures” against anyone who smuggles foodstuffs to the
“deserters, outlaws or other hostile groups”, the prohibition of any goods traffic in the
villages and areas, and the summoning of tribal chiefs and other prominent figures in the
marsh community against their will and requiring them to cooperate in a campaign
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against deserters to prevent the imposition of sanctions against their tribe or to raise
currently imposed sanctions. 235 The letter continues on to say that these actions will be
controlled by the committee headed by the Secretary for the Bureau for the Organization
of the South and describes the use of helicopters to maintain security in the area, and the
potential for and eventual need to “regroup marsh villages on dry land” to open access
deep into the marsh area. 236 It is evident that this subversive element was felt to be
strong and dangerous because they state that the actions taken against such peoples
should be commensurate with the threat posed as they are disrupting security and stability
in the entire region. 237

B. Circumstantial Evidence
The international courts try to maintain a strong reliance on solely physical
evidence and spoken testimony. However, they have determined that, in the interest of
justice, they may rely solely on circumstantial evidence. 238 In numerous cases, the
Yugoslavian tribunal held that the use of circumstantial evidence is important to point to
the guilt of a party and will be accepted to prove culpability, intent, and other required
elements of a crime. 239 The court held that the use of such evidence, taken in
combination with one another, may point to the guilt of the accused party because they
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would not usually exist in combination unless the accused did what they are charged
with. 240 Such a conclusion must be beyond a reasonable doubt and must be the only
reasonable conclusion available under the circumstances as presented. If there is another
viable explanation then they may not be found liable. 241
In the present case, there are a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence that
must be reviewed. First, there is the creation of the drainage project. While the official
reason was to create viable land for farming, the effect was to take water that was to be
used for irrigation, and drain it directly into the Persian Gulf. 242 It is necessary to review
the act of creating this project as well as the omission by failing to implement any true
irrigation plan for the newly acquired water. 243 The amount of money diverted from
other necessary projects seems to indicate that the government felt a great need for this
project to be completed. 244 Why then would they fail to use the water as they claim they
planned to?
Next, there are the military operations in the marsh region. As of yet there have
been no denials that there was a systematic procedure of attacking villages with artillery,
raiding the villages, arresting people and then razing the entire village. 245 These
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assertions have been made by numerous refugees from the marshes.246 If these actions
are proven to have been taking place, they should be reviewed to determine if they were
part of a broader scheme with the intent to violate the rights of the Ma’dan people.
Next, the use of numerous forms of propaganda against the marsh Arabs has been
shown to have diminished their place in society and led them to be subjected to negative
treatment by their fellow Iraqi people. 247 Were these actions intended to bring about the
destruction of the Ma’dan people as described in the crime of genocide, or was it merely
a systematic attack on their good name?
Finally, if the sole purpose of these actions were to gain land for the betterment of
the country as a whole, what was the purpose of denying marsh peoples medical care and
foodstuffs? Not only are these actions documented in reports from humanitarian
organizations and refugees, the Iraqi government’s own documents state that this is one
of the imposed actions that they would affect. 248 Assuming a lack of culpable action, is
there a plausible explanation for such actions or do they speak to a broader plan with a
truly discriminatory purpose?
V. CONCLUSION
With the evidence currently available to the prosecutor for the Iraqi Special
Tribunal with regards to this matter, it should seem apparent that there is a justifiable
cause to move forward. The leadership of the country of Iraq has violated numerous
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conventions in which they are either signatories or have become customary international
law. Due to these actions, it would be pertinent at this time for the prosecutor to bring
formal charges against those who would likely be held culpable for ordering and
performing the above mentioned breaches.
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